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NEW CONSUMER PROTECTION PRIVATE ACTION TEST:
CLARIFICATION OR FURTHER CONFUSION?-Hangman
Ridge TrainingStables v. Safeco Title InsuranceCo., 105 Wn. 2d 778,
719 P.2d 531 (1986).
In HangmanRidge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., I the
Washington Supreme Court established a new test for plaintiffs to meet in
pursuing a private right of action under Washington's Consumer Protection
Act (CPA). 2 The court set forth a substantially revised method for establishing public interest impact for private CPA actions. In addition, the court
abolished its earlier distinction between per se and de facto CPA violations.
All private plaintiffs must now meet the same test.
This Note examines the legal background for private CPA actions prior
to Hangman Ridge. The Note observes that the Hangman Ridge test is
consistent with the statutory language creating a private CPA action. The
Note then analyzes the court's attempt to clarify the means of establishing
private actions under the CPA in two areas: First, the new method for
proving public interest; and second, the modification of the use of the term
"per se" in the context of the CPA. The Note concludes that the court's new
factors for establishing public interest are inconsistent and confusing. The
court's modification of the use of the term "per se," however, provides
clarity and certainty by deferring to legislative intent. The Note recommends that the court redefine the public interest factors in the new test to
increase certainty for plaintiffs and defendants. The court's modification of
the term "per se," however, should remain as set forth in Hangman Ridge,
with some clarification.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND PRIOR TO HANGMAN RIDGE

A.

Creationof the PrivateRight of Action

In 1970, the Washington legislature amended the CPA to create an
individual's right to bring a private action under the Act. 3 By adding this
1. 105 Wn. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
2. Washington's CPA, enacted in 1961, declares "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" to be unlawful. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.020 (1985). The Act provides for enforcement by the attorney general on behalf of the state. Id.
§ 19.86.080. The Act also allows civil actions for damages by private litigants. Id. § 19.86.090.
3. Id. § 19.86.090. This statute provides for private civil actions and states in part: "Any person
who is injured in his business or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020. . . may bring a civil
action. . . to recover the actual damages sustained by him ....
"The statute also provides for the
recovery of costs of suit, attorneys' fees, and, at the judge's discretion, treble damages up to $10,000.
Id.
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provision, the legislature intended to enlist the aid of individuals in the
enforcement of the CPA. 4 The private right of action provision encourages
individual plaintiffs damaged by unfair or deceptive acts to bring actions
for CPA violations, despite the potential high cost of litigation, by allowing
for the award of attorneys' fees and treble damages. 5 Contrary to clear
statutory wording, the CPA private action tests developed by the court
before Hangman Ridge did not explicitly include all of the elements
required by statute.
B.

EstablishingPrivate CPA Actions Before Hangman Ridge

Prior to Hangman Ridge, Washington courts interpreted the CPA to
allow private actions for de facto and per se violations of the statute.
Plaintiffs could demonstrate de facto violations by showing that particular
facts satisfied a judicially-established test. Proof of violation of another
statute in contravention of public policy could support per se violations.
1.

De Facto Violations

A plaintiff had to meet the requirements of the test set forth in Anhold v.
Daniels6 in order to sue successfully for a de facto violation before Hangman Ridge. The Anhold test required proof of an unfair or deceptive act in
trade or commerce and public interest impact. 7 Three considerations determined an act's unfairness: First, whether the act offended public policy as
established by statute or common law; second, whether the act was immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; and third, whether the act
caused substantial injury to consumers. 8 An act was deceptive if a plaintiff
4. Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wn. 2d 331, 335-36, 544 P.2d 88, 91 (1976). The Ligh~foot court
stated that a private individual could bring an action under the CPA only if the act or practice
complained of was one which would also be vulnerable to complaint by the attorney general. Id. at 334,
544 P.2d at 90.
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1985); see Leaffer & Lipson, ConsumerActions Against Unfair
or Deceptive Acts or Practices:The PrivateUses ofFederalTradeCommission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 521, 531-32 (1980) ("The [attorneys'] fee award provisions are intended.., to provide
an incentive for consumers to engage in litigation to protect their rights so that the statutes will be fully
enforced. "); Lovett, PrivateActionsforDeceptive Trade Practices,23 ADMIN. L. REV. 271,285 (1971)
("At least double or treble damages... would probably be necessary . . . to enable such consumer
action, and in addition, the consumer would have to recover his attorneys [sic] fees and costs of suit.").
6. 94 Wn. 2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 (1980), overruled,Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title
Ins. Co., 105 Wn. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
7. Anhold, 94 Wn. 2d at 45, 614 P.2d at 188.
8. Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Sav. Bank, 34 Wn. App. 45, 57, 659 P.2d 537, 545, review denied, 99
Wn. 2d 1023 (1983) (quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972)).
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could show that it had the capacity to deceive consumers. 9 Finally, the CPA
broadly defined trade and commerce to include the sale of assets or services
and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state.' 0
To prove public interest impact, the Anhold test required a showing that
the defendant's unfair or deceptive act induced the plaintiff to act or refrain
from acting and caused the plaintiff to suffer damages. "1In addition, the
defendant's act had to have the potential for repetition. 12 The court never
established the exact meaning of "potential for repetition."1 3 Later cases
suggested that a plaintiff could prove potential for repetition by showing
that the defendant engaged in a protracted course of unfair or deceptive
conduct, 14 utilized widespread advertising, 15 or injured consumers other

than the plaintiff. 16

2.

Per Se Violations

The history of the term "per se" in Washington CPA cases is confusing.
As the HangmanRidge court acknowledged, the court had previously used
per se in three contexts: First, per se unfair trade practices; second, per se
public interest impact; and third, per se violations. 17 The uses sometimes
overlapped, leading to confusion in distinguishing among them.
9. Haner v. Quincy Farm Chem., 97 Wn. 2d 753, 759,649 P.2d 828,831 (1982) ("For the conduct
to be ...
deceptive does not require that intent be shown if the action has the capacity to deceive a
substantial portion of the purchasing public.").
10. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.010(2) (1985). The language of the statute states: "'Trade' and
'commerce' shall include the sale of assets or services, and any commerce directly or indirectly
affecting the people of the state of Washington." Id.
11. Anhold, 94 Wn. 2d at 46, 614 P.2d at 188.
12. Id.
13. In Eastlake Constr. Co. v. Hess, 102 Wn. 2d 30, 52,686 P.2d 465,477 (1984), the court stated
that the potential for repetition must be real and substantial, as opposed to a hypothetical possibility that
the defendant's act would be repeated.
14. See, e.g., id. (proof that contractor engaged in pattern of untimely, erratic, inadequate, and
defective performance of construction contracts might be enough to show potential for repetition).
15. See, e.g., Luxon v. Caviezel, 42 Wn. App. 261, 269, 710 P.2d 809, 813 (1985) (deceptive
listing of house in multiple listing service had potential for repetition); Ulberg v. Seattle Bonded, Inc.,
28 Wn. App. 762, 766, 626 P.2d 522, 525 (1981) (misleading advertisements and promises that
defendant could collect unpaid child support had clear potential for repetition).
16. Cf.Rouse v. Glascam Builders, 101 Wn. 2d 127, 135,677 P.2d 125, 130 (1984) (court found no
potential for repetition of a condominium builder's unfair acts toward one of the condominium owners
because there was no evidence that the builder had acted unfairly or deceptively toward any other owner
in the development).
17. Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn. 2d 778, 792,719 P.2d 531,
538-39 (1986). While the supreme court at times found per se unfair trade practices and at other times
per se public interest impact, the court of appeals (Division I) developed its own test for per se violations
of the CPA. In Dempsey v. Joe Pignataro Chevrolet, 22 Wn. App. 384, 392-93, 589 P.2d 1265, 1270
(1979), the court set forth a four-part test for determining whether the violation of a specific statute was
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The court first recognized a per se unfair trade practice in State v.
Reader's DigestAssociation.18 The Reader'sDigest court stated that an act
which violated another statute and was against public policy was per se an
unfair trade practice within the meaning of the CPA. 19
Later, in Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 20 the court developed the public policy element of the Reader's Digest unfair trade
practice test. According to Salois, either the legislature or the judiciary
could declare that the violation of a given statute was against public
policy. 2 1 Thus, the violation of a statute which stated that it was in the
public interest, instead of one which stated that its violation was an unfair
or deceptive act, could constitute a per se unfair trade practice. 22 The Salois
court also implicitly equated the public policy requirement necessary to
establish an unfair trade practice with the public interest impact requirement contained in the de facto test for private actions. 23 As such, the case
was an early warning of the confusion to follow from the court's failure to
indicate whether the de facto and per se tests were independent alternatives
to each other or were instead interrelated.
per se a CPA violation. The Dempsey test required a plaintiff to prove: One, the violation of a statute;
two, that the statute was designed to protect the public; three, that the violation was the proximate cause
of damages sustained by the plaintiff; and four, that the plaintiff was within the class of people the
statute sought to protect. Id. This test was never used by the supreme court, but it was often applied at
the appellate court level either in conjunction with or in place of the test established in Salois v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). See, e.g., Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Say. Bank,
34 Wn. App. 45, 659 P.2d 537, review denied, 99 Wn. 2d 1023 (1983) (both Salois and Dempsey tests
used to determine whether there was a "'perse violation" of the CPA).
18. 81 Wn. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), appeal dismissedsub nom. Reader's Digest v. Washington, 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
19. Reader's Digest, 81 Wn. 2d at 270, 501 P.2d at 298. In Reader's Digest, the court held
defendant's actions to be per se unfair without looking at the specific language of the laws violated.
Defendant's sweepstakes violated article 2, § 24 of the Washington constitution, which prohibited
lotteries, and § 9.59.010 of the Revised Code of Washington, which made the operation of a lottery a
criminal offense. Id. Neither the constitutional provision nor the statute stated that operating a lottery
constituted an unfair or deceptive act. WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 24 (1889, amended 1972); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.59.010 (repealed 1973).
20. 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).
21. Salois, 90 Wn. 2d at 358, 581 P.2d at 135 1. The Saloiscourt stated the test as follows: "(1)
is the
action illegal, i.e., is it unlawful; and (2) is it against public policy as declared by the legislature or the
judiciary?" Id.
22. The Hangman Ridge court recognized this inconsistency and stated that the new test's
requirement of public interest impact replaced the public interest/public policy element of the Reader's
Digest test. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 786, 719 P.2d at 535-36. For the elements of the new
Hangman Ridge five-part test, see infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
23. Salois, 90 Wn. 2d at 359, 581 P.2d at 1351. In Salois, the specific statute which the defendant
violated was a provision of the Washington Insurance Code requiring that insurance brokers and agents
act in good faith. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (1985). Since that statute states "[t]he
business of
insurance is one affected by the public interest," the court found defendant's actions violating it to be
against public policy. Salois, 90 Wn. 2d at 359, 581 P.2d at 1351.
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Hanerv. Quincy Farm Chemicals24 introduced a second use of the term
"per se," a per se finding of public interest impact.2 5 In order to satisfy per
se the public interest impact requirement, the legislature had to declare
specifically the public interest of the violated statute. 26 This was contrary to
the Salois court's statement that either the legislature or the judiciary could
declare that a statute impacted the public interest.2 7 The Haner court also
stated that either a specific legislative declaration of public interest or
satisfaction of the Anhold public interest test must be shown in order to
establish a CPA violation even if a per se unfair trade practice existed under
Reader's Digest.2 8 Thus, the Haner court's requirement of specific statutory public interest language created an additional burden for plaintiffs
pursuing per se actions. It was also a further intermingling of the per se and
de facto tests.
In McRae v. Bolstad,29 the court used per se in a third manner when it
referred to findings of per se unfair trade practices as per se violations of the
CPA. 30 The court treated the Reader's Digest and Anhold tests as alternative ways to establish a private right of action and required a showing of
public interest only under Anhold. 31 The treatment of the two tests as
alternatives is inconsistent with Haner, and it illustrates the court's inability to take a clear stance on private actions under the CPA.
II.

THE HANGMAN RIDGE DECISION

A.

Facts

The Hangman Ridge decision arose from a suit alleging unauthorized
practice of law in connection with a loan closing and property transfer.
Arthur and Lois McNeil, the sole shareholders of Hangman Ridge Training
Stables, Inc. and the plaintiffs in this action, applied for a loan. 32 As a
condition of granting the loan, the lender required a transfer of certain real
33
estate held by the Hangman Ridge corporation to the McNeils personally.
24. 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982).
25. Haner, 97 Wn. 2d at 761, 649 P.2d at 833.
26. Id. at 762, 649 P.2d at 833.
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
28. Haner, 97 Wn. 2d at 762, 649 P.2d at 833.
29. 101 Wn. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984).
30. McRae, 101 Wn. 2d at 165, 676 P.2d at 499.
31. Id.
32. Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn. 2d 778,780,719 P.2d 531,
533 (1986); Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 33 Wn. App. 129, 130, 652 P.2d
962,963 (1982), remandedwithout opinion, 101 Wn. 2d 1009, 679 P.2d 368 (1984), later app. 105 Wn.
2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
33. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 781, 719 P.2d at 533.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 62:277, 1987

Safeco Title Insurance Company closed the escrow, and at closing Safeco's
agent informed the McNeils that she was not an attorney. 34 She did not,
35
however, advise them to seek independent legal counsel or tax advice.
One year after the loan closing and accompanying conveyance of real
estate, the McNeils' attorney discovered that the conveyance resulted in a
$3,500 tax liability. 36 The McNeils contended that the tax liability could
have been avoided if the Safeco closing agent had warned them of the
potential tax ramifications. 37 As a result, the McNeils and Hangman Ridge
sued Safeco for unauthorized practice of law in preparing the deed, legal
malpractice in failing to advise them of possible tax liability, and violation
38
of the CPA.
The trial court found that Safeco's deed preparation and loan closing
constituted the unauthorized practice of law, 39 and on remand the court held
this to be a per se violation of the CPA. 40 The supreme court took the case
34. Id.
35. Id. Prior to closing, the lender told the McNeils that they might need legal assistance regarding
the transaction, but despite retaining both an attorney and an accountant on a regular basis, the McNeils
did not seek independent advice. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 781-82, 719 P.2d at 533; Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 33
Wn. App. 129, 131, 652 P.2d 962, 964 (1982), remandedwithout opinion, 101 Wn. 2d 1009, 679 P.2d
368 (1984), later app. 105 Wn. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
39. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 782, 719 P.2d at 533. This case was tried twice. At the first
trial, the court held that Safeco's actions constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Id. The court also
found, however, that Safeco's closing agent did not violate the standard of care for attorneys who
prepare deeds and close real estate transactions. Id. Thus, Safeco did not breach any duty owed to the
McNeils, and the McNeils could not successfully pursue a legal malpractice action. Id. The trial court
also found no CPA violation. Id. Consequently, it did not award the requested injunction or attorneys'
fees. Id.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. Hangman Ridge, 33 Wn. App. at 137, 652
P.2d at 967. The McNeils petitioned the supreme court for review. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 782,
719 P.2d at 533. This petition was granted and then was continued pending the decision in Bowers v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983), a case which also involved an
allegation of unauthorized practice of law by an escrow agent. Id.
Bowers involved a suit for alleged unlawful practice of law by an escrow closer in preparing the
closing documents and escrow instructions for the sale of real estate. 100 Wn. 2d at 583-84, 675 P.2d at
196-97. In Bowers, the supreme court found that those actions constituted the unauthorized practice of
law and that they were unfair and deceptive under the capacity-to-deceive standard set forth in Haner v.
Quincy Farm Chem., 97 Wn. 2d 753,649 P.2d 828 (1982). Bowers, 100 Wn. 2d at 591-92, 675 P.2d at
200-01. The court stated without discussion that the facts satisfied all elements of the Anhold test and
thus constituted a CPA violation. Id. at 592, 675 P.2d at 201.
After reaching a decision in Bowers, the supreme court remanded the Hangman Ridge case to the
court of appeals (Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 101 Wn. 2d 1009,679 P.2d
368 (1984) (remanded without opinion)) for reconsideration in light of Bowers. Hangman Ridge, 105
Wn. 2d at 782, 719 P.2d at 534. The court of appeals remanded to the trial court with the same
instructions. Id.
40. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 782-83, 719 P.2d at 534. The trial court found a per se
violation of the CPA because Safeco violated § 2.48.180 of the Revised Code of Washington, which
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"as a vehicle for clarification of the private right of action under the
CPA." 4 1 The supreme court applied a new test for private rights of action
and held that the McNeils failed to establish a CPA violation. 42
B.

Changes in Legal Guidelinesfor CPA Violations

In HangmanRidge, the supreme court replaced the earlier tests for both
de facto and per se CPA violations with a single test. The court also
reformulated the method for establishing public interest impact and modified the meaning of the term "per se" as used in the context of the CPA.
1.

New Five-PartTest

The new test for all private actions under the CPA requires the plaintiff to
prove five elements: One, an unfair or deceptive act or practice; 43 two,
occurring in trade or commerce; three, public interest impact; four, injury
to plaintiff's business or property; 44 and five, causation. 45 Although all
makes the unauthorized practice of law a misdemeanor. HangmanRidge, 33 Wn. App. at 136,652 P.2d
at 967. Although the trial court found that the McNeils had sustained no damages, it enjoined Safeco
from the unauthorized activity and awarded the McNeils approximately $45,000 in attorneys' fees,
expert witness fees, and costs. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 783, 719 P.2d at 534. Safeco then
appealed the finding of a CPA violation and the award of attorneys' fees. Id.
41. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 783, 719 P.2d at 534. Safeco filed a notice of appeal to Division
III of the Washington Court of Appeals, and the McNeils cross-appealed to the supreme court. Opening
Brief of Appellant at 10, Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn. 2d 778, 719
P.2d 531 (1986) (No. 51213-2). Division III
then referred the case to the supreme court pursuant to Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5.3(g), which treats all notices of appeal as being directed to the supreme court
whenever notices in the same case are directed to both the court of appeals and the supreme court. Id.
42. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn.2d at 783, 719 P.2d at 539-40. The supreme court accordingly
reversed the trial court's award of attorneys' fees. Id.
43. The Hangman Ridge court retained the "capacity-to-deceive" standard set forth in Haner v.
Quincy Farm Chem., 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982), as the measure of an act's deceptiveness,
thus requiring neither intent to deceive on the part of the seller nor actual deception or reliance on the
part of the buyer. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 785,719 P.2d at 535. This appears to be inconsistent
with requiring proof of injury and causation as the fourth and fifth elements ofthe test since the purpose
of the capacity-to-deceive test, as stated by the court in HangmanRidge, is "to deter deceptive conduct
before injury occurs." Id. The capacity-to-deceive standard has been applied to CPA enforcement by
the attorney general who does not need to prove causation. See, e.g., Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wn.App. 98,
110, 639 P.2d 832, 840, review denied, 91 Wn.2d 1015 (1982). Despite the logical inconsistency,
however, the standard is appropriate as a threshold requirement for private actions since it is a lower
standard more easily met than a standard requiring the plaintiff to prove actual intent to deceive on the
part of the seller and actual reliance on the part of the buyer.
44. The requirement that the injury be to plaintiff's business or property is consistent with earlier
case law. See, e.g., Keyes v. Bollinger, 31 Wn. App. 286, 296, 640 P.2d 1077, 1083-84 (1982) (only
injury to plaintiff's business or property is compensable under the CPA; damages for mental distress,
embarrassment, and inconvenience which do not entail pecuniary loss are not recoverable).
45. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 780, 719 P.2d at 533. The Hangman Ridge court did not
specify the level of causation which will be required under the new test, but in earlier cases the court
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potential private action plaintiffs must now meet the same test, certain
46
elements of the new test may be satisfied per se.
2.

Public Interest Impact Under Hangman Ridge

In conjunction with its new five-part test, the court in Hangman Ridge
established two sets of factors to determine public interest impact. 47 The
court established one set of factors for what it termed consumer transactions and another set for private disputes. 48 The court did not state general
rules for determining whether a given transaction is consumer or private.
Instead, the decision listed cases which would serve as examples for each
type of transaction. Consumer transactions include sales of wheat seed,
new and used automobiles, and mobile homes. 49 Private disputes include
those between attorneys and clients, insurers and insureds, real estate
agents and property purchasers, and escrow closers and clients. 50
To find public interest impact in a consumer transaction, the trier of fact
should consider five factors: First, whether the alleged act was committed
in the course of the defendant's business; second, whether it was part of a
pattern or generalized course of conduct; third, whether repeated acts were
committed prior to the act involving the plaintiff; fourth, whether there is a
real and substantial potential for repetition of the defendant's conduct
following the act involving the plaintiff; and fifth, if the act involved a
single transaction, whether many consumers were affected or are likely to
51
be affected by it.
To find public interest impact in a private dispute, the trier of fact should
look to four factors: First, whether the alleged act was committed in the
required proximate cause. See, e.g., Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wn. App. 359, 368, 623 P.2d
710, 716 (1981) (plaintiffs could not recover for alleged CPA violation because they were unable to
establish damages proximately caused by any unfair or deceptive practice of defendant).
46. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 785-86, 791, 719 P.2d at 535, 538.
47. Id. at 790-91, 719 P.2d at 537-38.
48.

Id.

49. Id. at 789-90, 719 P.2d at 537-38. As examples of consumer transaction cases, the court listed
Haner v. Quincy Farm Chem., 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982) (purchase of defective wheat seed);
Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wn. App. 359, 623 P.2d 710 (198 1) (purchase of defective mobile
home); Dempsey v. Joe Pignataro Chevrolet, 22 Wn. App. 384, 589 P.2d 1265 (1979) (purchase of new

car with defective paint job); and Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, 16 Wn. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349
(1976) (purchase of defective used car).
50. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 790, 719 P.2d at 538. As examples of private dispute cases, the
court listed Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wn. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976) (attorney-client relationship);
Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52,691 P.2d 163 (1984) (attorney-client relationship); Salois v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978) (insurance); McRae v. Bolstad, 101 Wn. 2d
161,676 P.2d 496 (1984) (realtor selling property); and Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.
2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983) (escrow closer).
51.

Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 790, 719 P.2d at 537-38.
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course of the defendant's business; second, whether the defendant advertised to the public in general; third, whether the defendant actively solicited
the plaintiff; and fourth, whether the plaintiff and the defendant occupied
unequal bargaining positions. 52 The court stated that no single factor is
dispositive under either set of factors, nor do all factors need to be present in
53
order to show that a defendant's action has public interest impact.
3.

Use ofPer Se Under Hangman Ridge

In HangmanRidge, the court abolished "per se violations" of the CPA,
noting its previous conflicting and confusing use of the term. 54 The court
attempted to resolve this confusion by allowing plaintiffs to satisfy some of
the elements of the new five-part test per se by showing the violation of
another statute. 55 If a statute states that its violation constitutes either an
unfair trade practice or a violation of section 19.86.020 of the Revised Code
of Washington, then a plaintiff may use the defendant's violation of that
statute to establish per se the first two elements of the HangmanRidge test,
unfair or deceptive act occurring in trade or commerce. 56 The third element
of the HangmanRidge test, public interest impact, can be met by showing
that the defendant violated a statute which the legislature has declared to be
52. Id. at 790-91, 719 P.2d at 538.
53. Id. at 791, 719 P.2d at 538.
54. Id. at 792, 719 P.2d at 538-39. The HangmanRidge test is a significant departure from the
earlier tests for per se violations. The HangmanRidge test will limit the plaintiff's ability to establish a
per se finding of unfair or deceptive conduct. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. The
Reader's Digest and Salois tests simply required a showing that another statute with public interest
impact had been violated in order to find a per se unfair trade practice. See supra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text. Under Hangman Ridge, the plaintiff must show that the other statute explicitly
states either that its violation is an unfair or deceptive practice or that its violation is a violation of
§ 19.86.020 of the Revised Code of Washington. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 786-87, 719 P.2d at
535-36.
55. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 786-87, 791, 719 P.2d at 535, 538. Aside from the statutes
which the court listed as examples of those giving rise to a per se showing of an unfair or deceptive act in
trade or commerce, violation of other statutes containing language similar to those listed by the court
will also probably constitute an unfair trade practice. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.11.260 (1986)
(auctioneers); 18.35.180 (1985) (hearing aids); 19.16.440 (1985) (collection agencies); 19.52.036
(1985) (usurious contracts); 19.100.190(1985) (franchise investment protection); 19.134.070(5) (1986)
(credit services); 19.138.080(1986) (travel charter and tour operators); 28B.05.230 (1985) (educational
services); 46.71.070 (1985) (automotive repairs); 49.60.030(3) (1985) (discriminatory practices);
68.46.210 (1985) (cemetery prearrangement contracts).
56. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 785-86, 719 P.2d at 535-36. Through the statutes it used as
examples, the supreme court made clear that a violation of a statute which references § 19.86.020 is a
per se unfair trade practice. The court, however, did not discuss statutes which make a general reference
to the CPA as a whole. Thus, it is unclear whether a violation of such a statute gives rise solely to a per se
unfair trade practice or whether it also satisfies per se the public interest impact requirement. See infra
notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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in the public interest. 57 A plaintiff able to establish a per se unfair trade
practice and per se public interest impact would, according to the new test,
58
still need to prove the fourth and fifth elements, injury and causation.
III.

ANALYSIS

In formulating the new test for private actions under the CPA, the
Hangman Ridge court's goal was to clarify this "highly confused area of
the law." 59 The court was only partly successful. The new five-part test
closely follows the statutory language found in the CPA's private action
provision. Despite that fact, the court's new sets of factors for satisfying the
public interest impact requirement are as confusing as earlier public interest impact tests. The court was successful, however, in its clarification and
redefinition of the term "per se" as used in the context of the CPA.
A.

Consistency With Statutory Language

For the first time since the Washington legislature adopted the CPA, the
court closely followed the statute in creating a test for private actions.
Requirements for unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce appear in
section 19.86.020.60 The statutory provision creating the private right of
action requires causation and damages. 61 The public interest impact requirement was derived from the purpose section of the Act. 62 Thus, the
57. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 791-92, 719 P.2d at 538. The requirement of a legislative, as
opposed to judicial, declaration of public interest impact is consistent with the court's earlier decision in
Haner v. Quincy Farm Chem., 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982). See supra text accompanying note
26.
58. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 792, 719 P.2d at 539.
59. Id. at 783, 719 P.2d at 534. All of the elements required by the Hangman Ridge test were
present, either explicitly or implicitly, in earlier private action tests, and many ofthe elements retain the
meaning and application developed in earlier decisions. For example, the requirements of an unfair or
deceptive act and that the act occur in trade or commerce were present in the Anhold test. See supra text
accompanying note 7. Presumably, the Hangman Ridge decision will not change the way those
elements are applied. The public interest impact requirement was also present in the Anhold test. but its
form, effect, and application will be different under Hangman Ridge. See supra notes 11-16 and
accompanying text. The last two elements of the Hangman Ridge test, injury and causation, were
implicit in the public interest impact requirement of the Anhold test since the plaintiff had to prove that
the defendant's action induced the plaintiff's action or inaction and that damages resulted. See supra
text accompanying note 11.
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1985) ("Unfair methods ofcompetition and unfairor deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." (emphasis
added)). This provision is incorporated into the CPA private right of action. See id. § 19.86.090.
61. Id. § 19.86.090 ("Any person who is injured in his businessor property by a violationofRCW
19.86.020 . . . may bring a civil action ..
"(emphasis added)).
62. The public interest impact requirement was originally derived from the purpose section of the
CPA: "It is, however, the intent of the legislature that this act shall not be construed to prohibit acts or
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HangmanRidge test is consistent with legislative directives, and in that
63
sense, it is an improvement over the tests set forth in prior cases.
B.

Criticism of the New Methodfor DeterminingPublic Interest
Impact

One significant difference between the Hangman Ridge test and earlier
tests for establishing a private CPA action is in proving public interest
impact. The new factors do not adequately clarify the requirements for a
showing of public interest impact. Instead, the factors create additional
confusion and uncertainty. The court failed to adequately distinguish
between types of transactions, made consumer factors more difficult to
prove than private factors, and provided no guidance in assigning weight to
the factors.
1.

Failureto Adequately DistinguishBetween Consumer Transactions
and PrivateDisputes

The first problem with the public interest element of the HangmanRidge
test is the court's division of transactions into consumer and private
categories without definite guidelines for distinguishing between the categories. Rather than specifying a dividing line, the court provided a limited
number of examples of each type of transaction. 64 Such a finite list will
create difficulties for a potential plaintiff whose injury does not fall into any
of the transaction categories listed as examples. The limited list will likely
lead to disputes over and inconsistency in the classification of transactions.
In dividing cases into consumer transactions and private disputes, the
court apparently distinguished between cases involving sales of goods 65
and those involving the provision of services. 66 Although this is a valid
"Id. § 19.86.920 (emphasis added).
practices. . . which are not injurious to thepublic interest ..
The legitimacy of the public interest impact requirement has been extensively discussed elsewhere and
is outside the scope of this Note. For a history of the development of the requirement, see Comment,
Washington ConsumerProtectionAct-PublicInterestand the PrivateLitigant, 60 WASH. L. REv. 201
(1984). For analyses of the arguments for and against requiring public interest impact, see Note, On the
Proprietyof the PublicInterestRequirement in the Washington Consumer ProtectionAct, I0U. PuGEr
SouND L. REv. 143 (1987); Comment, The Consumer Protection Act Private Right of Action: A
Reevaluation, 19 GoNz. L. REv. 673 (1983); Comment, PrivateSuits Under Washington'sConsumer
ProtectionAct: The PublicInterest Requirement, 54 WASH. L. REv. 795 (1979).
63. The Anhold test, for example, did not explicitly require causation and damages, although they
were implicit in the public interest element. See supra notes 7, 11 and accompanying text.
64. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 789-91, 719 P.2d at 537-38. See supra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text for a list of the court's example cases.
65. For instance, the court listed sales of wheat seed, new and used automobiles, and mobile homes
as consumer transactions. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
66. The court listed private disputes as including the services of attorneys, insurance and real estate
agents, and escrow closers. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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distinction in some contexts, 67 it has no place in the context of the CPA. If
the goal of the CPA is to protect consumers whenever a transaction has
public interest impact, 68 this protection should apply equally whether the
consumer purchased a car from a car dealership or a tract of land through a
real estate brokerage. The meaningful distinction would be between buying
a car from a dealership and buying a car from a private party, between
buying a house through a real estate agent and buying a house directly from
a private citizen. The dealership and agent transactions are clearly consumer in nature, while the transactions involving individual sellers are
private. Indeed, the court has already recognized such a distinction under
both sets of factors by requiring that the transaction occur in the course of
the defendant's business. 69 A further distinction on the basis of selling
goods or providing services is confusing and unnecessary.
2.

Consumer FactorsMore Difficult to Prove Than PrivateFactors

Assuming the court can be persuaded to adopt the course of business
distinction between consumer and private transactions, the court's intention of making public interest impact easier to establish in consumer
transactions is proper. 70 Consumer transactions by their very nature are
more likely to be repeated than are private transactions. 7 1Therefore, unfair
or deceptive practices which occur in consumer transactions are similarly
more susceptible to repetition.
Contrary to the court's intent, however, the proposed factors make it
more difficult to establish public interest impact in consumer transactions
than in private disputes. For consumer transactions, the Hangman Ridge
test requires a showing that individuals besides the plaintiff have been or
are likely to be injured by the defendant's unfair or deceptive acts. 72 Proof
of injury to consumers other than the plaintiff may be difficult, especially
since the court offers no guidance as to the proof sufficient to support a
potential for repetition of the unfair or deceptive act. In contrast, the factors
67. Washington's Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to the sale of real estate or the
provision of services. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.2-105(l) (1985).
68. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
70. In Hangman Ridge, the court stated:
Where the transaction was essentially a private dispute. . . it may be more difficult to show that
the public has an interest in the subject matter. Ordinarily, a breach of a private contract affecting
no one but the parties to the contract is not an act or practice affecting the public interest.
105 Wn. 2d at 790, 719 P.2d at 538.
71. For example, individuals in private transactions normally have only one car to sell at any given
time. Automobile dealers, on the other hand, may sell hundreds each year.
72. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 790, 719 P.2d at 538.
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listed for private transactions include advertising, solicitation, and unequal
bargaining power.73 Proof of advertisement or unequal bargaining power is
relatively easy to demonstrate. 74 Thus, it is easier to prove that a private
dispute has public interest impact.
A possible explanation for this inconsistency may be found by looking at
the cases which the HangmanRidge court cited as examples under the two
types of transactions. The court seems to have listed the factors exactly
backwards: the factors derived from consumer transaction cases are listed
as private dispute factors, and vice versa. For example, Haner v. Quincy
Farm Chemicals, 75 which is listed as a consumer transaction case, decided
that no public interest impact existed on the basis of lack of advertising or
other inducement. 76 Whether other customers had been or could be injured
77
by false labeling was not mentioned. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile,
another consumer transaction case, 78 found a CPA violation based on the
unequal bargaining power between the parties, 79 a factor listed by the
HangmanRidge court as relevant to private disputes.80 On the other hand,
Bowers v. TransamericaTitle Insurance Co., 81 which the HangmanRidge
court listed as an example of a private dispute, found public interest impact
based on the defendant's generalized course of conduct and the potential for
repetition of the unfair and deceptive practice. 82 However, the Hangman
Ridge court listed generalized course of conduct and potential for repetition
83
as consumer transaction factors.
This transposition of the consumer transaction and private dispute factors is a major weakness of the HangmanRidge decision. It frustrates both
the court's attempt to clarify the private action requirements and the court's
intent to make public interest impact easier to prove in consumer transactions than in private disputes.
73. Id. at 790-91, 719 P.2d at 538.
74. For example, the plaintiff can simply show the court a copy of a newspaper advertisement.
75. 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982).
76. The Hanercourt quoted with approval from Judge Roe's lower court opinion: "Here there was
no showing that there were any inducements, deceptive advertisements, sales techniques or false
representations which induced the sale." Id. at 759-60, 649 P.2d at 832 (quoting Hanerv. Quincy Farm
Chem., 29 Wn. App. 93,107,637 P.2d571,580 (1981) (Roe, J., concurring inpart, dissenting in part)).
77. 16 Wn. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
78. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 790, 719 P.2d at 537.
79. Testo, 16 Wn. App. at 51, 554 P.2d at 358.
80. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 791, 719 P.2d at 538.
81. 100 Wn. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983).
82. Bowers, 100 Wn. 2d at 592, 675 P.2d at 201.
83. HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 790, 719 P.2d at 538. The court stated "it is the likelihood that
additional plaintiffs have been or will be injured in exactly the same fashion that changes a factual
pattern from'a private dispute to one that affects the public interest." Id. Yet the court listed factors
relating to that issue under the test for consumer transactions. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 5 1.
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Failureto Assign Weight to Factors

An additional problem with the public interest impact element in Hangman Ridge is that no single factor is dispositive and not all factors need be
present under either type of transaction. 84 This leaves a trier of fact with no
indication of the relative importance of the factors. Whether the factors are
exclusive is also unclear. If additional, overlooked indications of public
interest impact were present, would they also go toward satisfying the
public interest element?
This lack of guidance as to the weight and exclusivity of the factors
prohibits, short of trial, a conclusive determination of the public interest
impact element of the Hangman Ridge test. Because the decision stated
that the factors' relevance is for the trier of fact, the court's flexible standard
may foreclose the possibility of summary judgment on the public interest
element. 85 Potential plaintiffs will have difficulty ascertaining the viability
of their cases. It may be unclear whether a case falls into the private dispute
or consumer transaction category, how many of the factors must be met, the
weight to give each factor, and whether the listed factors are exclusive. The
only testing ground will be in the courtroom through litigation. This is an
inefficient use of an already overburdened legal system. Moreover, litigation is costly to parties in time and money, and its effect may be to dissuade
injured persons from bringing CPA actions.
C.

Modification of Use of Per Se in New Test

The court's modification of its previous use of the term "per se" 86 is
significant because it clarified a confusing and ambiguous aspect of private
actions. Although the court's clarification will restrict the number of
plaintiffs who can satisfy the first two elements of the new test per se, 87 the
88
test's benefits outweigh this disadvantage.
84.
85.

Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn.2d at 791, 719 P.2d at 538.
Id.

86. Id. at 792, 719 P.2d at 538-39.
87. The court's decision limits the abilities of plaintiffs to satisfy the first two elements of the new
test by showing that astatute other than the CPA has been violated. To show a per se unfair trade practice
under Hangman Ridge, a plaintiff must prove the violation of a statute which states that its violation is
an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce or that its violation is a violation of § 19.86.020. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text. Specific statutory language indicating an unfair trade practice
was not necessary before the decision in Hangman Ridge; requiring it creates an additional burden for

potential plaintiffs to meet. For a foreshadowing of the court's treatment of per se in Hangman Ridge,
see Note, New Limits to the Application of the Consumer ProtectionAct, 61 WASH. L. REv. 275, 281
(1986).
88. The restriction on plaintiffs' abilities to bring CPA actions may be inconsistent with the private

action's purpose to enlist injured parties' aid in enforcing the CPA. See supratext accompanying note 4.
However, the limit on plaintiffs' abilities to bring actions is outweighed by increased certainty and
consistency with legislative intent provided by the court's redefinitions.
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Consistency With Legislative Intent

1.

In redefining per se, the court looked to legislative intent as expressed by
the language in many statutes linking the statutes either to section
19.86.02089 or to the public interest impact requirement. 90 Because of the
court's deference to statutory language, a plaintiff's ability to bring CPA
private actions arising from violations of other statutes is now solely in the
legislature's hands. 91The HangmanRidge court clearly stated the language
it will recognize as satisfying certain elements of the test. 92 Consequently,
the legislature can depend on the court's reading of that language and can
create new statutory provisions with the knowledge that the court will
interpret them as the legislature intends. If the legislature does not agree
with the HangmanRidge court's redefinition of per se actions or wishes to
expand plaintiffs' abilities to bring private CPA actions, the legislature can
specifically overrule the decision in this area.
Failureto Address Statutory Language Variations

2.

The Hangman Ridge court's treatment of per se is ambiguous because
the court failed to address language in other statutes referencing the CPA as
a whole, rather than either section 19.86.020 or public interest impact
alone. At least two statutes do not limit their connection with the CPA to a
particular provision; instead they specify that their violation constitutes a
violation of the entire CPA. 93 Although the court stated at the end of its
discussion of per se unfair trade practices that it would recognize the
94
connection between a statute and the CPA when the statute so specified,
the next sentence of the opinion listed the additional requirement of public
interest impact. 95 The decision is therefore ambiguous. The court may read
statutes referencing the CPA as a whole as satisfying per se the requirements of unfair trade practice and public interest impact. Alternatively, the
court may treat the violation of such a statute as giving rise to a CPA action
89.
90.
text.
91.
92.

HangmanRidge, 105 Wn. 2d at 786,719 P.2d at 536; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 791,719 P.2d at 538-39; see supranote 57 and accompanying

93.

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.440(2) (1985) (mobile homes) ("failure to remedy any

Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 787, 719 P.2d at 536.
Id. at 791, 719 P.2d at 538-39.

breach . . . is a violation of the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW, and subject to the
remedies provided in that chapter"); id. § 19.130.060 (telephone equipment sales) ("Violation of this
chapter constitutes a violation of chapter 19.86 RCW, the consumer protection act.").
94. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn. 2d at 787, 719 P.2d at 536 ("Where the Legislature specifically
defines the exact relationship between a statute and the CPA, this court will acknowledge that
relationship.").
95. Id. ("The third element is that of a public interest showing.").
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brought by the attorney general and might still require a private plaintiff to
separately show public interest impact. 96 The court at some point will have
to clarify this ambiguity.
D.

ProposedNew, Directionsfor the Court

For establishing the public interest element, the court should abolish the
distinction between consumer transactions and private disputes based on
the nature of the product sold. 97 A division on the basis of whether an act
occurred in the course of the defendant's business would be more meaningful. 98 If an act occurs in the course of business, then it may have public
interest impact and thus fall within the CPA's provisions; if it does not occur
in the course of business, then it is a private dispute and should be excluded
from CPA actions altogether. Once a plaintiff shows that a defendant's
actions occurred in the course of business, the court should consider
whether there is a chance that other people besides the plaintiff have been or
will be injured by the actions. 99 This could be shown by proving direct
solicitation, advertising, a pattern of unfair or deceptive conduct, or prior
or subsequent injury to other consumers. The substance of many of the
factors listed by the court should therefore be maintained. The proposed
test for public interest impact would thus have two parts: First, a showing
that the act occurred in the course of defendant's business; and second, a
showing of potential for injury to others beside the plaintiff.
Because the new test is more certain, it would provide stability in
evaluating and litigating CPA actions. The test would afford a simple
checklist for potential plaintiffs to use in determining whether a CPA
violation has occurred and would provide enough certainty for a court to
grant summary judgment on this issue in appropriate cases.
The court should retain the modification of per se set forth in Hangman
Ridge. The modification provides clarity and certainty and gives the legislature the power specifically to declare per se unfair trade practices and per
se public interest impact. However, the court should clarify the application
96. Whether the court would also require a showing of causation and damages in such a case is
uncertain. However, as proof of causation and damages is required under the private right of action
provision of the CPA, the court should also require such proof even when the plaintiff can show
violation of another statute linked to the CPA.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
98. Course of business should be defined broadly enough to include repeated sales or provisions of
services by people not ordinarily considered to be in business.
99. Potential for injury would be similar to the potential for repetition element of the Anhold public
interest impact test. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. The new test would be more certain,
however, because showing any one of the facts listed in the next sentence in text would satisfy the
potential for injury requirement.
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of its new definition to statutes with varying language. In order to be
consistent and treat all plaintiffs equally, a private CPA action should
require a showing of public interest impact even when the plaintiff can
prove violation of a statute which by its language is a violation of the CPA
as a whole. 100 Requiring public interest impact in this setting would resolve
the current decision's ambiguity toward certain statutes. 10 1 The requirements for a plaintiff attempting to satisfy per se any of the first three
elements of the Hangman Ridge test would also be clarified.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Hangman Ridge court's new five-part test follows the statutory
language of the provision creating the private right of action. Its basic
structure is an improvement over prior private action tests and should be
retained. The new public interest impact factors, however, confuse rather
than clarify the public interest element of the test. They should be replaced
with simpler guidelines which would allow parties to assess the viability of
their actions at an early stage and avoid costly litigation. The Hangman
Ridge court successfully clarified the role of most other statutory violations
as a way to satisfy certain elements of the five-part test, and that aspect of
the decision should be followed. Aside from the public interest impact
factors, the Hangman Ridge test for private actions is an important reformulation of a significant area of Washington law.
Susan Clyatt Lybeck

100. The plaintiff, of course, could show public interest impact by meeting the elements of the test
proposed above or by showing a specific legislative declaration of public interest in the statute violated.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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